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ABSTRACT: As new forms of employment like the work in the gig economy become a norm around the 
world, it becomes necessary to study the nature of this employment and its impact on workers. The aim of 
this article is to describe the individual experiences of Uber drivers in the context of precarious work, and 
to examine the impact of this online platform on their work. It is based on individual in-depth interviews 
conducted among Uber drivers in Poland in 2018
1
. The results of the study show that the work they 
perform can be characterized as precarious: they work long hours (also at night and on holidays), they 
have low income (especially in relation to the number of working hours) and lack social or trade union 
protection; they also often work without employment contracts. On the other hand, however, they have a 
positive view of their working situation using the app. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The development of platform-based business models which rely on the sharing 
economy, such as BlaBlaCar and AirBnB (Forde et al. 2017), has influenced the 
relationships between employers and employees (Degryse 2017; Gillespie 2010; McKee 
2017; Srnicek 2017). As it is today, labour market is characterized by almost unlimited 
flexibility and hyper-competitiveness on the one hand, and limited social protection 
and difficult access to collective protection (e.g. by trade unions) on the other (Drache, 
LeMesurier, and Noiseux 2015). In this context, the rise of the so-called sharing 
economy can be viewed as the ultimate “ideal” of flexibility, which, however, may lead 
to the precarization of working conditions. Of course, it needs to be noted that both 
the emergence of the precariat (Standing 2011) and the growing number of the 
working poor (Shipler 2005) had been the case also prior to the advent of the modern 
version of the sharing economy.  
Changes in labour relations stemming from the expansion of platforms involve such 
elements as remote provision of services, the development of flexible forms of 
employment (Drahokoupil and Fabo 2016), the increase in global labour supply and 
demand, and changes in work organization (task work, network structures) (Hua and 
Ray 2018). Under certain conditions, they may lead to precarious work (Adriaanse 
2016). 
As new forms of employment like platform work become a norm around the world, 
it becomes necessary to study the nature of the employment being created and its 
impact on the economic and social lives of workers (Surie and Koduganti 2016). The 
impact of the platform economy on the labour market in different countries has been 
widely investigated (Armano and Murgia 2017; Chen and Sheldon 2016; Codagnone, 
Biagi, and Abadie 2016; Hall and Krueger 2017; Gierten 2016; Berg et al. 2018). 
Eric Tucker (2017) observes that “technological utopians celebrate the 
transformation of traditional workers into micro-entrepreneurs, free to work whenever 
and for as long as they want in proportion to their preferences for income and leisure”. 
One unquestionable pioneer in the field of platform work is Uber. As it offers the 
benefit of flexibility and self-employment, Uber is a self-proclaimed saviour of the 
working class from the constraints of the standard labour model in general, and from 
control of the employer in particular (Srnicek, 2017, 82). Critics, on the other hand, 
stress a degradation of the status of employee, increasing precariousness and a general 
deterioration of employment stability in the labour market as such. Considering its 
apparent inclusivity, does it mean that the Uber business model contributes to the 
empowerment of drivers? 
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The aim of this article is to describe the individual experiences of Uber drivers in 
Poland in the context of precarious work, and to examine the impact of this online 
platform on their work. Part two is devoted to theoretical considerations involved in 
the issues under investigation, and part three offers characteristics of Uber as a case of 
sharing economy platform business model. The next sections describe the 
methodology and findings of the study, followed by their discussion and conclusions. 
 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
 
In the period of late capitalism and austerity, new areas of work are emerging 
outside the current system of regulations (Sundararajan 2016). In the new world of 
work, the opposition between standard and non-standard work arrangements, and 
between employment and self-employment is increasingly blurred. Emiliana Armano 
and Annalisa Murgia (2017) claim that a renewed interpretation of work is also needed 
in order to rethink the concepts of inequality and precariousness as they emerge from 
subjective experiences. Indeed, the emerging areas of work are no longer – or at least 
not only – mere containers of the growing forms of “non- standard” employment. 
Iain Campbell and Robin Price (2016) have designed a clear conceptualization of 
precarity issues that separates five analytical levels: precariousness in employment, 
precarious work, precarious workers individually and as an emerging class, and 
precarity as a general condition of social life. Most researchers tend to focus on 
precarious work (Campbell and Price 2016; Burrows 2013) or precarious workers 
individually (Marino et al. 2018; Pulignano, Ortíz Gervasi, and de Franceschi 2016). 
While some scholars go a step further and view them as a class-in-the-making 
(Standing 2011; Savage et al. 2013), others oppose this standpoint (Wright 2016; Hardy 
2015). 
Among many different and often contradictory definitions of precarity and 
precarious work (Rodgers and Rodgers 1989; Dörre, Kraemer, and Speidel 2006; Butler 
2006; Barbier, Brygoo, and Viguier 2002; Vosko 2006; Standing 2011), one proposal 
which deserves attention is that made by Arne Kalleberg (Kalleberg 2014; Hewison and 
Kalleberg 2013; Kalleberg 2009). He defines precarious work as insecure (high risk of 
losing it, irregular working time), unstable (limited social and financial privileges) and 
uncertain (low prospects of promotion to better jobs). Some scholars (Murgia and 
Selmi 2012) consider precariousness as a subjectively perceived situation rather than 
an objectively measurable condition. 
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Isabel Lorey (2006) draws attention to the phenomenon of “self precarization”, 
observed particularly among people working in the so-called creative professions, such 
as artists. She observes that many of them choose to live a life of precarity and would 
be worried about the prospect of adapting to what is considered “normal”, particularly 
with regard to working life. Klaus Dorre (2014), on the other hand, concludes that 
people doing precarious work fall below standard levels of social protection and 
integration as defined in welfare states. At the level of subjective experience, 
precarious work and employment induce a sense of meaninglessness and perceived 
disdain from others.  
Performing work which depends on online platforms can be interpreted in terms of 
precariousness as existential condition (Lorey 2015): life is precarious, dependent and 
never completely protectable, and thus people are inevitably exposed to unforeseen 
circumstances. The precarious nature of such work has been the focus of a number of 
studies (Coyle 2017; Muntaner 2018; Petriglieri, Ashford, and Wrzesniewski 2018), with 
Uber drivers as one of the most often analysed cases of work precarization (Adriaanse 
2016; Dubal 2017; Hua and Ray 2018; Malin and Chandler 2017; Peticca-Harris, 
DeGama, and Ravishankar 2018). 
New technologies allow traditional jobs to be divided into discrete tasks that are 
widely distributed across workers and dynamically priced given prevailing supply and 
demand conditions. This “sharing” economy represents a shift away from fixed 
employment contracts to a more flexible work system, and is most common in two-
sided markets in which a company acts as a platform to connect service providers and 
consumers (Chen and Sheldon 2016).  
However, there is a need for a more precise framework of sharing economy. 
According to Belk (2007: 127), “sharing is an alternative to the private ownership that is 
emphasized in both marketplace exchange and gift-giving. In sharing, two or more 
people may enjoy the benefits (or costs) that flow from possessing a thing. Rather than 
distinguishing what is mine and yours, sharing defines something as ours”. However, it 
should be noted that not all examples of sharing economy are in fact “true sharing”. 
Companies like Uber or AirBnB are for-profit “sharing” services and do not build strong 
bonds or feelings of commonality (Belk 2017), which is why they are sometimes called 
“pseudo-sharing” (Belk 2014).  
Following Huws et al. (2016), platform work can be defined as both platform-
mediated work, performed (or at least delivered) online (e.g. Amazon Mechanical Turk, 
Upwork, Clickworker), and offline work where a platform only serves the purpose of 
matching clients with service providers (e.g. Uber, TaskRabbit). Other classifications 
include one proposed by Fabo et al. (2017), where the classic division into offline and 
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online services is supplemented with the third category: transport platforms. 
Codagnone et al. (2016), in turn, identify the following four types of platforms: (1) 
peer-to-peer assets-intensive provision of goods and services; (2) peer-to-peer manual 
labour-intensive unskilled provision of personal and home services; (3) peer-to-
business cognitive labour-intensive unskilled provision of services to businesses; (4) 
peer-to-business cognitive labour-intensive skilled provision of services to businesses. 
In view of the multitude of conceptualizations and classifications of the notion of 
sharing, we have to agree with Arcidiacono et al.’s (2018) conclusion that we should 
consider thinking within the framework of the “varieties of the sharing economy” and 
accept the plurality of this ecosystem. 
No matter what classification and definition of platform work we adopt, it is 
apparent that the number of employees involved in such working patterns is growing. 
A recent survey of UK adults by Ursula Huws, Neil H. Spencer and Simon Joyce (2016) 
found that as many as 11% had successfully earned income through work platforms, 
while 3% said they were doing so at least weekly. A study of the European Commission 
(2018) shows that 23% of the respondents have used services offered via 
work/collaborative platforms. Among them, over a half have accessed services in the 
accommodation (57%) and transport (51%) sectors. 
The emergence of platform work has the potential to boost employment and 
increase flexibility for workers. However, platforms also facilitate flexible work 
arrangements, which could lead to an increase in poorer quality jobs, with poor career 
prospects, and contribute to the growth of precarious work (Mira d’Ercole and 
MacDonald, 2018). 
For the purposes of this study, I adopted the definition of precarious work as one 
characterized by: a subjective sense of uncertainty (as perceived by the employee), lack 
of job security, long working hours, low income and lack of employee rights (social care 
and trade union protection) (Bosmans et al. 2016; Lorey 2015). This issue is discussed 
in more detail in the methodology section further below. 
 
 
3. Uber and its characteristics 
 
Austin Zwick (2018) observes that the competitive pressures of neoliberal 
economies have compelled employers to devolve responsibilities to contractors and 
subcontractors. The rise of platform-based business models has significantly 
accelerated this trend, and the most important pioneer here is Uber. 
Partecipazione e conflitto, 12(3) 2019: 717-741, DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v12i3p717 
  
722 
 
Like other companies active in this sector, Uber views its own role as that of an 
intermediary (Kashyap and Bhatia 2018),2 whose task is only to facilitate access to 
underutilized and undervalued goods and services (Lobel 2016). As such, then, it is not 
a transport company but a technology provider charging 25% commission for each 
ride.  
As in late 2018, Uber is active in 737 cities in 84 countries around the globe and is 
constantly expanding its operations. Apart from a ride-sharing platform, the company 
also operates a food delivery network (Uber Eats) and has become involved in haulage 
and medical transport services (Uber Freight and Uber Health). As can be seen, then, 
the technology start-up is expanding the range of activity and sets new trends followed 
by other players in the market. 
This business model is characterized by high inclusivity, as requirements for Uber 
drivers are not particularly demanding: it is enough to make sure that the car one plans 
to use to provide services complies with Uber specifications, register online, download 
the application and add required documentation (e.g. driving licence). 
The activity of Uber has been the subject of interest among researchers for some 
time. Their studies most often concern the operation of the company in particular 
countries, from the United States (Hall and Krueger 2017) and Canada (Jamil and 
Noiseux 2018), through India (Surie and Koduganti 2016; Kashyap and Bhatia 2018), to 
South Africa (Huang, Majid, and Daku 2019). Some authors focus on technological 
aspects of the venture (Chen and Sheldon 2016; Rosenblat and Stark 2016) or analyse 
to what extent Uber can be considered an employer or a commissioner (Prassl and 
Risak 2015). Others discuss the role of the company in the development of passenger 
transport (Cramer and Krueger 2016; Tucker 2017) and the gig economy as such 
(Berger et al. 2018; De Stefano 2015). Another study area is different barriers (mainly 
legal regulations) which hinder operations of the company (Crespo 2016) and confine 
many Uber drivers to grey economy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 However, the Court of Justice of the European Union (20 December 2017, Case C-434/15) ruled that the service pro-
vided by Uber, a peer-to-peer ridesharing, food delivery and transportation network company, must be classified as a 
transport service. Therefore, Member States must regulate the conditions under which the service is provided in con-
formity with the general rules of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Carpagnano 2018). For court 
judgements in other EU countries, see Martins 2019. 
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4. Empirical data, time frame and research methods 
 
In the CEE countries the idea of platform work is only emerging, and the regulatory 
framework of such activity has not yet been developed. Therefore, the aim of this 
article is to describe the individual experiences of Uber drivers in Poland in the context 
of precarious work, and to examine the impact of this online platform on their work. 
The research problem under investigation is whether the organization of work 
determined by the app is related to the subjective feeling of precarious work among the 
drivers. For the purposes of this study, the main research question was formulated as 
follows: How do Uber drivers assess the impact of the platform on their work in the 
context of precariousness? 
In order to answer this research question, I conducted a qualitative study among ten 
Uber drivers in one of the Polish cities. The study relied on the use of in-depth 
interviews (IDI) and was carried out in November 2018. In the case of all informants 
this work was their basic source of income. All the informants were male. The 
interview scenario concerned four dimensions of work precarization: uncertainty, 
security, pay, working time, employee rights, and the impact of the online platform. 
One factor at play here was the small size of the sample: the study had been planned 
as preliminary research aiming to collect information about the nature of the job in the 
context of precarious work with a particular focus on the role of the app in the work 
process. Basing on the findings presented below, the following study will attempt to 
measure the intensity of precarity factors among workers relying on various online 
platform business models. 
All data was stored and analysed using computer-assisted qualitative data analysis 
software (RQDA), which facilitated assigning codes to particular parts of the 
informants' statements and categorizing groups of codes. The adopted multi-stage 
coding procedure (largely based on the grounded theory) consisted of several rounds: 
the first round (open coding) was based on the researcher’s intuition, the second 
(focused coding) involved classification of codes into categories that emerged during 
the analysis, and the third one aimed to identify the core analytical category. In the 
next stage, categories were classified into topics, which enabled analysis of the 
respondents’ work in terms of the dimensions of precarious work (legal and regulatory, 
organizational and economic), and the role of the app. Temporariness was identified as 
the core analytical category (Strauss, Glaser 2017). 
Finally, it is worth mentioning the most important peculiarities of the Polish labour 
market. According to the data provided by Statistics Poland (2019), recent years have 
seen the intensification of positive trends in the Polish labour market: low 
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unemployment rate (4.5%) and increasing number of employees in 2017. On the other 
hand, at the same time we have to deal with a very high rate of temporary 
employment (25% of all working population), a high number of civil-law contracts – 
6.9% of all employed (which is particularly unfavourable from employees’ point of 
view, as such contracts  do not offer them full social protection), and finally very high 
estimates of undeclared work rate – 5.4% of all working population.  
 
 
5. Temporariness in precarious work via app: research findings 
 
The study aimed to establish whether working as an Uber driver can be 
characterized as precarious work (both in objective and subjective terms) and to 
identify the role of the app in this process. The most general, overall category that can 
be used to sharpen and clarify the concept of precarity applied in this article is 
temporariness. Interviews with the informants concerned different aspects of the 
principal dimensions of precarious work: legal and regulatory dimension, organizational 
dimension and economic dimension. What characterizes all these aspects is 
temporariness (core category). 
 
(a) legal and regulatory dimension 
 
Considering the legal and regulatory dimension, the interviews with Uber drivers 
concerned formal issues related to work and employment (contracts and agreements), 
the question of their legal status as regards transport regulations (mainly the issue of 
passenger transport licence) and the attendant consequences.3 Consequently, this 
dimension includes also the issue of collective bargaining, trade union membership and 
social rights. 
The key point to note is intermediaries between Uber and the drivers. Known as 
fleet partners, these business entities comply with the requirements for Uber partners 
(which individual drivers are often unable to meet) and enable drivers to work using 
the app at the lowest possible cost. In fact, most Uber drivers rely on fleet partners and 
 
3 The new legislation, which will come into force on 1 January 2020, introduces the same rights and obligations for all 
entities providing commercial passenger transport services. In practical terms, both taxi and Uber drivers will have to 
meet the same formal requirements, and in this way the work of the latter will become fully legal. The question about 
economic consequences of the so-called lex Uber remains unanswered. It is estimated that the interest in working for 
Uber will significantly decrease (due to formal requirements, which will be higher than today), which may result in high-
er prices and thus bring a decline in demand for the service. This, in turn, may lead to Uber's withdrawal from Poland 
due to low profitability. 
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are charged weekly commission for their services (such as legal and managerial) on top 
of the 25% Uber service fee. As a result, the sum they receive for their work every 
week (bank transfer or cash) is substantially lower than the actual fares. 
It must be noted that as it is in Poland Uber’s business model created opportunities 
for intermediaries between the company and the drivers – they register business 
entities and subcontract individuals who are not entrepreneurs themselves. It seems 
that, apart from Uber, it is the middlemen who benefit the most from the system, 
which, as it were, sanctioned their operations. In fact, then, the only connection 
between the drivers and Uber is the app. The money earned in the application goes to 
drivers only through recommended Uber fleet partners. 
As regards contractual arrangements, only two informants were registered as self-
employed; most others had a bailment agreement (also known as lending for use 
agreement) or driver account management agreement with the fleet partner. One of 
them had a verbal agreement, and another a contract of mandate for the national 
minimum wage, with the remainder paid cash in hand. 
In the absence of any contractual agreement between the driver and Uber, the types 
of contract/agreement between the driver and the fleet partner amount to walking a 
fine line between legal and illegal. Although their relations resemble B2B 
arrangements, the drivers in fact do not conduct business activity – they are employees 
and should have employment contracts. In the case of verbal agreements, claiming any 
rights or benefits is practically impossible. 
What is more, none of the informants had a full grasp of the system of calculations. 
They knew about the 25% commission for Uber, but they did not know the exact role 
of the fleet partner in the process: what its commission was for and whether it made 
payments towards their taxes or insurance. Neither were they fully aware of the kind 
of contract/agreement they were bound by, or who the other party was: 
 
-Most people work on those junk contracts, some sort of cooperation agreements; but really, 
I’m an employee and I don’t get anything. (U2: 20 years old, first job, secondary education) 
-I signed something, but I don’t remember what it was. (U9: 40 years old, next job, vocational 
education) 
 
This may stem from the attitude of the drivers to their work for Uber. None of those 
interviewed saw themselves doing it in a few years’ time. They insisted that although it 
was their basic source of income at the moment, they treated it as merely temporary 
occupation; working for Uber was definitely not what they wanted to do in life: 
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The more you drive, the more money you get; but it isn’t really something I want to do in life, 
to be an Uber driver, I mean. (U9) 
You shouldn’t treat it as an ultimate job, a full-time thing, or something you do for a long 
time; I think it’s a very good job as a casual thing, for someone looking for a job or someone 
between jobs. (U6: 48 years old, next job, higher education) 
 
This attitude serves as an excuse for their ignorance of legal and formal issues 
concerning their status: if this occupation were “something [they] want to do in life”, 
they would get interested. In their approach, the short-term nature of their work fully 
explains their lack of knowledge or even interest in formalities. This may also explain 
why the principles of Uber’s operations in Poland are not fully transparent: if the 
drivers only work on a short-term basis, it does not matter much whether what they do 
is legal or not. 
 
I tell you, I don’t see myself in this job for the rest of my life. It’s just something I do at the 
moment. (U9) 
 
In general, the informants were not familiar even with those regulations which 
concerned them specifically. They fully relied on fleet partners in all formal and legal 
matters and they did not run their own checks. It could be said that their blind trust 
was based on the assumption that if so many drivers worked for fleet partners it was 
just impossible that all of them would be cheated. 
They also mostly had no knowledge of the legal status of Uber’s business operations 
in Poland, and trusted their fleet partners that they complied with the rules. As of mid-
2018 Uber requires its partners to have a valid passenger transport licence. While fleet 
partners comply, they insist that their drivers do not need to, which is not entirely true. 
One thing beyond doubt is that the regulatory framework in Poland is behind the 
technological change, and that app-based work does not fit into the existing categories. 
Other aspects of the legal and regulatory dimension are the degree of certainty that 
employment will continue over a longer period of time, the continuity of employment 
as such, and job security and stability. As regards continuity of employment, the 
interviewed drivers did not see their future with Uber. As mentioned above, they 
stressed the temporary nature of their work; this was the case even among those who 
had been with Uber for a few years. On the other hand, all of them were convinced 
that their job was stable and secure, even though they did not know how long they 
would be allowed to continue, as they were aware of the controversy over Uber’s 
operations in Poland and the problems concerning legal regulations it faced. In other 
words, they saw their jobs as secure unless Uber was banned.  
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Other issues within this dimension mainly concern collective protection of workers 
(trade union protection) and protection of their social rights. Considering the former, 
all the informants stated that Uber drivers had no collective protection of any kind, 
including collective agreements (none of the respondents has ever heard about them). 
In addition, most of them declared they would not be interested in joining trade unions 
or receiving their protection even if they had such an opportunity.  
 
I haven’t been that interested to get to know what positive things there might be, so I’m not 
really sure. (U13: 20 years, first job, student) 
 
In general, it could be said that they are not interested in any activity which goes 
beyond their work itself. This attitude may be attributed to two major factors. Firstly, 
as discussed above, they perceive their work for Uber as temporary, hence they are 
unwilling to engage in anything that would amount to stronger association with the 
company. Secondly, there is also their attitude to trade unions as such: they view them 
as a relic of the pre-Internet era on the one hand, and share the general attitude of 
Poles towards such organizations on the other. According to the CBOS Public Opinion 
Research Centre, Poles do not believe that trade unions may improve the working 
conditions of employees, and do not treat them as a trustworthy partner in social 
dialogue (CBOS 2017). 
Considering the social rights, in turn, it appears that while all those interviewed 
would want to be protected, they were not ready to make financial contributions. 
Informants stressed that although they had no such protection it did not put them off 
their work. What is more, some of them were aware of how the system works in 
Poland and did not want to support it. Rather, they were happy about (at least 
theoretical) freedom offered by Uber: 
 
Paid sick leave, and who’s supposed to pay for it? You can pay ZUS [Social Security Institution] 
to get insured (…) and get sick pay when you’re ill, but you don’t have to do it. It’s not about 
employees’ rights; it’s about employees taking advantage of the rest of society – it’s other 
people who pay for their sick leave and they often take advantage of it. (U6) 
 
On the other hand, they realized certain problems stemming from the fact that their 
status was not formally regulated. One of them was insurance: 
 
There should be some kind of insurance. It’s obvious that there are accidents, there are 
different situations; in general, it isn’t exactly very safe to drive around, so this thing about 
insurance should be regulated somehow. I’m always worried about it and customers 
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sometimes ask me how it works – if we had an accident just now, if something happened to 
me, who would take responsibility? (U12) 
 
Considering the legal and regulatory dimension, then, it can be concluded that the 
work of Uber drivers is precarious. This largely stems from the fact that they have no 
employment contracts (or even contracts of mandate), as it is not possible to have 
workers’ rights without a proper contract in place. The informants did not feel the 
need to get organized or receive protection by trade unions. Although most of them 
reported similar problems and collective response to unfavourable practices would 
certainly make their work easier, such a move seems highly unlikely: they do not have a 
sense of common interest and do not identify with their occupation, which makes any 
kind of fight for collective rights practically impossible. 
On the other hand, they fully realized the nature of their job and did not view their 
own situation as unfavourable. All of them stressed that it was very easy (or even too 
easy) to become an Uber driver. As a result, they could not expect any particularly 
favourable working conditions or even standard workers’ rights.  
As regards the stability and security of employment (at least when measured by the 
type of the contract/agreement), the work of Uber drivers is also precarious: they work 
on the basis of licencing regulations which are not entirely clear, and have no 
employment contract with Uber or its fleet partner (which would give them a sense of 
security). However, this objective assessment does not coincide with their own 
perception. In their view, the measure of stability is the number of hours they work – 
the more they drive, the more stability and security they get. Not only do they have no 
knowledge about the formal side of their activity, but also they are not interested in it 
at all. Since they treat their work as something they only do for a while, they think it is 
not worth going into the formal details involved (even though this “while” has 
sometimes been as long as three years). 
One issue that needs to be mentioned here is the strongly negative attitude of those 
surveyed to foreigners working for Uber in Poland. According to most of them, foreign 
drivers spoil the reputation of the company among the customers: they do not have an 
adequate command of Polish and do not know the city where they work. This has a 
direct negative impact on the informants, as they have less work than they could. A 
relatively large number of foreigners in this occupation also means that it is practically 
impossible to talk about any community of interests among Uber drivers in Poland. 
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(b) organizational dimension 
 
The analysis of the organizational dimension focused on working hours (and the 
opportunities to determine/choose daily work schedule), working time and autonomy 
at work. Although it may seem that the drivers determine their working hours 
themselves, this in fact is not the case. All the informants stressed that they had most 
clients on weekday mornings (before ten o’clock), afternoons, from four o’clock until 
late at night, and on weekend nights. This means that in fact it is the market demand 
(i.e. the customers) that has an impact on when they work and earn the most. 
Moreover, those who drive fleet partner cars rather than their own ones are under 
pressure to work as long as possible. Most of them do twelve-hour shifts, which they 
have to arrange with the fleet manager and/or other drivers using the same car. As can 
be seen, then, opportunities to freely determine their daily work schedule are rather 
limited. 
When it comes to working time, all the informants said they drove even ten hours a 
day (with a break in the middle of the day), including weekends. This system means 
that they work much longer than the standard forty hours. What is more, the fact that 
they spend mornings and afternoons working tends to affect their family life.  
 
Sometimes I drive from six to ten, and then I drive from four to eight and that’s eight hours. 
And sometimes I drive from seven to seven on Friday, that’s twelve hours, then all night, and 
then the same on Saturday again. (U18: 26 years old, next job, vocational education) 
 
As regards their autonomy at work, in turn, they all stressed they were their own 
bosses and could log off the app and do their own things whenever they wanted. Is 
their autonomy really unlimited? Since they are aware that their app-based work is 
their main source of income, they most often spend long hours in their cars trying to 
maximize their profit.  
Although they are seemingly fully autonomous and theoretically can go back home 
to have dinner, they prefer to eat fast food and return to the streets as soon as 
possible. This does not seem to come as a sign of full autonomy. Alex Rosenblat (2018: 
82) writes that “while Uber hires rarefied artificial-intelligence experts internationally 
to spearhead self-driving car initiatives, its drivers are still struggling to find places to 
pee”. 
Considering the organizational dimension, then, it can be concluded that in objective 
terms work of Uber drivers is best described as precarious: it involves long working 
hours (longer than those standard), split shifts, working at night and at weekends. 
From the point of view of the drivers, however, all these features are positive. In their 
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view, the fact that they can decide when and how long they want to work makes them 
their own bosses. This outweighs the long hours they have to work if they want to 
make a sufficient income. They see the idea that, at least in theory, they can take a 
break and go home any time as the greatest advantage. On the other hand, such 
organization of work means that working as an Uber driver is difficult for women, as 
they most often have to combine their professional and family responsibilities. 
 
(c) economic dimension 
 
The last dimension of precarious work analysed here concerns such issues as pay 
and financial stability. The informants also talked about surge pricing, the system of 
payment for services and the transparency of transactions with Uber and its fleet 
partners.  
When talking about their pay, all those interviewed stressed that their income was 
low and that they would not be able to support themselves without working more than 
the standard forty hours a week. This means that they can reach financial stability only 
if they work up to twelve hours a day and/or at weekends. According to the 
informants, high rotation of drivers working for Uber resulted from poor pay (as 
compared to the situation three or four years before). Another factor at play was that a 
high number of drivers (mostly foreigners) meant a lower number of available rides. As 
a result, none of the respondents saw driving for Uber as a permanent job. 
 
This system is becoming less and less profitable for the driver. (U6) 
 
Uber company applies a system of surge pricing which aims to motivate the drivers 
to move to areas where there is more demand for their services. Surge pricing means 
that requesting a ride in a particular area is more expensive due to higher demand and 
limited supply; the price is calculated using a special algorithm. At least in theory, the 
system enables drivers to gain higher profit. 
However, none of the informants saw it as a sufficient incentive. Firstly, the system 
does not always work properly (it happens that higher fares are not charged even 
though they theoretically should). Secondly, before they have driven across the city to 
such an area the price surge would most likely no longer apply. Although they are 
certainly very happy to benefit from surge pricing, they do not see it worth driving 
from where they are to designated areas at all.  
On the other hand, all those interviewed had a very positive opinion on the system 
of payments, in which a user’s account is charged when a trip is completed. Some of 
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them stressed that the system improves their security: they do not need to have any 
cash and thus are not a potential target for robbery. In their view, cash payments 
would unnecessarily complicate the system and make it resemble the one applied in 
taxi companies. 
When it comes to the system of calculations, they were aware of the 25% Uber 
commission on the fares. They also knew that the amount they would finally receive 
depended on the applicable charges for fleet partner services.  
Considering the economic dimension, then, in terms of objective criteria the work of 
Uber drivers can be classified as precarious. Most of those interviewed stressed that 
their pay was low and that they faced a considerable competition from other drivers 
(particularly foreigners). As a result, when compared to the situation three or four 
years before, they were unable to earn the same pay in the same amount of time. They 
also observed that low income was the most frequent reason why drivers left Uber.  
Under the circumstances, the informants developed a strategy which enabled them 
to compensate for lower fares and protect their income – they simply worked more. 
This comes as a typical case of precarization of working conditions: sufficient income 
can only be earned by working longer hours.  
 
(d) the role of the app 
 
The final part attempts to provide answers to the question whether the app 
contributes to the precarization of work. In general terms, all the informants 
considered the application to be the best element of their work. In their view, it is easy 
to operate, can be used intuitively and does not require advanced IT knowledge. 
Although they sometimes complained about updates and new features (e.g. the 
layout), those comments reflected their attachment to older versions rather than 
negative opinion about the new ones. Regardless of their age, all the drivers found it 
easy to use and had no major complaints about it. 
When compared to traditional taxi companies, one important advantage of working 
for Uber is that the drivers using the app can reject the rides they are offered or cancel 
them once accepted. They do this for a number of reasons, mainly the distance to pick-
up point without information on the destination. This means they have a say about 
where and for how much they drive. Although most of the respondents declared they 
did not overuse these opportunities, the fact that they could refuse trips they did not 
want to make had a considerable impact on their positive opinion on their work and 
gave them a sense of independence. 
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In view of these findings, taking, again, only the subjective perspective of 
informants, it can be concluded that the application as such does not have an 
immediate impact on the precarization of drivers’ work. 
On the other hand, looking at this issue in a broader perspective and referring to the 
role of technology and its impact on the individual, it can be concluded that the app 
conceals from the drivers the existing networks of exploitation and inequality on the 
labour market. They must comply with the rules imposed by Uber, which pursues its 
profit-driven activity under the guise of free service and unlimited availability. To some 
extent, then, those “independent” drivers are subject to algorithmization, for example 
when they are offered incentives for achieving results (such as a bonus for completing 
twenty rides in four hours). This means that the app takes over managing people and, 
under the guise of a "bonus" for the driver, essentially aims to multiply the profit it 
makes. Therefore, it is driven not so much by the idea of using underutilized resources 
(“true sharing”), as by simple calculation based on the balance of profits and losses 
("pseudo-sharing"). This means that the autonomy and flexibility it offers are only 
apparent (Rosenblat, Stark 2016). 
This is particularly evident in the case of the driver rating system. Uber’s business 
model is constructed in such a way that drivers are considered “independent partners”, 
who are not controlled by the company and act without interference on its part. It is 
the passenger who plays the role of superior and evaluates the quality of work 
performed by the driver using the rating system. To some extent, then, he/she decides 
about the driver's future career in Uber. How is this possible? Drivers whose average 
rating is too low may have their account suspended or even deactivated. As Alex 
Rosenblat (2018) writes, for fear of being removed from the platform on account of 
low rating, the drivers are ready to endure more comments, insults and complaints 
from passengers, and at the same time have no tools to protect themselves against 
them. 
 
 
6. Discussion 
 
As it turns out, then, answering the question whether the app leads to the 
precarization of work is not as straightforward as it would seem. The issue involves the 
entire system of platform-based work rather than the use of application as such (in 
terms of software installed on the phone).  
As presented above, considering generally accepted indicators (Kalleberg 2009, 
2014) and the (operational) definition adopted by the researcher, the work of Uber 
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drivers displays features of precarious work in nearly all analysed dimensions: it is 
insecure (no employment contracts), unstable (the formal situation of Uber and its 
drivers is not regulated), low-paid, involves long working hours and does not offer 
social protection.  
Only one element of the definition of precarious work adopted in this study is 
difficult to assess unequivocally – the subjective sense of uncertainty (as defined by the 
workers themselves). Indeed, none of the informants complained about uncertainty. 
Moreover, all of them stressed that they were able to reach stability (of work and pay) 
by working longer hours. In their personal view, then, app-based work for Uber does 
not involve uncertainty or risk.  
On the other hand, they do not seem to be aware of the fact that the app imposes a 
working style, rules, standards and norms, and in return offers an apparent “freedom” 
of working when they like and how much they like. This can be described as “illusive 
authority” of the driver: although the analysed tool apparently simplifies his/her work 
in every respect, on closer examination it changes the rules so that most of the benefits 
are on Uber's side. 
The question is how to interpret this view. If the work of Uber drivers meets all 
generally accepted objective criteria of precarious work, why do the drivers themselves 
think otherwise? One possible answer here is the attitude of most informants: they 
treat their work for Uber as temporary. None of them see themselves working there in 
five or ten years’ time. Quite on the contrary, most stated they either had already 
made a move towards a different job (they attended some required courses) or 
intended to do it sooner rather than later. As they adopt a short-term perspective, 
then, they are relatively happy about their work and have no reason to complain. 
Stability does not come as an issue: for the time being they earn money (if they think 
they do not make enough they can always work more) and they will not care about 
“that whole Uber thing” in the future anyway. Their point of reference is not Uber but 
their work “after Uber”, which they tend to idealize.  
The concept of temporariness could also be used to close the gap between the 
“objective” and the “subjective” conception of precarity. The fact that Uber drivers do 
not view themselves as people doing precarious work, and that at the same time they 
have accepted its objective conditions (no contracts, excessive working hours, no social 
security or representation of interests), could be interpreted from the Foucauldian 
perspective as an expression of the “entrepreneurial of himself” (Foucault 2008). 
Entrepreneurs of themselves are thus “competence machines”, who produce a flow of 
income; they want to be cautiously developed, carefully guarded and continually 
adjusted to the demands of the market. To be an “enterprising self” also means to 
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learn to continually inspect one’s investments, and if necessary, to revise. The 
enterprising self, then, is someone who unceasingly makes decisions (Bröckling 2005). 
Like the classic “homo economicus”, Uber drivers have to consider profitability and 
effectiveness on a daily basis. They somehow have to combine individuality, autonomy 
and freedom of choice in a framework determined by market economy. 
Another factor at play is that working for Uber is one of very few highly inclusive 
professions: anyone holding a valid driving licence can join and start to earn money 
driving people around. This inclusivity on the one hand, and the fact that drivers can 
leave any time on the other, can have an impact on their positive view of their work. 
Although (in theory) Uber account can be deactivated (e.g. if a driver’s rating falls 
below 4.6 out of 5 or the number of trips he/she rejects is high), this does not happen 
very often. In addition, a suspended account can be easily reactivated practically 
without any negative consequences.  
Some drivers interviewed in the study had worked for Uber a few years before and 
returned later. This indicates that workers can perceive platform-based work with its 
high inclusiveness as an antidote to unemployment and lack of stable employment. 
Whenever they are between jobs, they can maintain their income level by driving for 
Uber.  
This means that platform-based work plays a very important role on the labour 
market as it is today. The above study conducted among Uber drivers in Poland makes 
it possible to see both its negative and positive aspects. On the one hand, it is unstable 
and uncertain and thus can be described as precarious. What also confirms this 
assessment is lack of employment security (sometimes workers have no contracts at 
all), long working hours (also at night and on holidays), absence of social or trade union 
protection and, last but not least, low pay. On the other hand, however, it is easy both 
to start doing it and to leave, and to do it only when one needs to, e.g. between jobs or 
when different (and more stable) employment is not available. As a result, most people 
doing platform- or app-based work view it in positive terms.  
Such work is particularly important for those who so far have had no other choice 
than to do precarious work – particularly young people and migrants, whose position 
on the global labour market is difficult. The case of Uber indicates that platform-based 
work, with its essential element of flexibility, can improve the situation of young 
people and enable some of them to enter the labour market and earn their first pay. 
Although this does not mean that their transition to other forms of employment is 
easy, work experience they gain doing platform-based work improves their prospects 
for better jobs in the future. 
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To some extent, analogical mechanism operates in the case of migrants. The 
informants observed that Uber provides a perfect opportunity for those who have no 
other chance to enter the labour market. However, they also concluded that in Poland 
the process unfortunately involved malpractice and negatively affected the image of 
the company: foreign drivers often do not speak Polish and cannot communicate with 
customers; some of them are prone to reckless driving, which is largely attributed to 
different practices in their native countries. As a result, increasingly more customers 
switch to traditional taxis: although they are more expensive, they are driven by Poles. 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
Studies conducted among Uber drivers indicate that the future of work belongs to 
online platforms and mobile applications. Technological change, which also has an 
impact on the labour market, simply cannot be stopped. On the other hand, we should 
closely examine the conditions and quality of platform- and app-based work. Analysing 
the work of drivers who rely on Uber rides as their basic source of income, we can 
notice that it is characterized by typical features of precarious work. 
It can therefore be concluded that app-based work leads to precarization. At the 
same time, however, it needs to be stressed that it is not the app as such that is the 
source of the problem. Rather, the key factor at play here is the entire system of work 
behind it. Such conclusions are also confirmed by studies conducted by other 
researchers (e.g. Owczarek 2018).  
Positive aspects of platform-based work cannot overshadow the risk of precarity 
which it carries. On the one hand, it is easily available and provides opportunities for 
certain categories of people who so far have found it difficult to enter the labour 
market and have often been confined to unemployment. On the other hand, transition 
from such work to standard, better-paid employment which gives a sense of security is 
very difficult.  
One empowering mechanism of Uber is its capacity to overcome formal and 
informal barriers to entering the labour market for vulnerable categories of workers 
like migrants or women. We may see this fact as result of platformization of work. 
In the case of the study presented in this article, the greatest attention should be 
devoted to the temporariness of precarious work (Rodgers and Rodgers 1989). There is 
no formal agreement between the Uber company and its drivers – the only connection 
between them is the application. The drivers sign a civil law contract (e.g. a contract of 
mandate, never an employment contract) with Uber’s fleet partners, companies which 
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lend them formal support in return for a weekly fee, but are not their employer or 
principal. The most interesting issue, then, is the unexplored role of those partners. All 
the respondents work for an intermediary who acts like an employer but is not one. On 
the one hand, the partner’s requirements towards drivers are typical of an employer, 
on the other – it offers them the so-called junk contracts or even allows them to work 
without any contract at all, which makes their situation very precarious. 
To sum up, the objectively poor working conditions are accepted by workers and 
even legitimized by their attitude. What is more, the drivers also accept the rules 
dictated by the app and they do not view a combination of control and autonomy as 
pure illusion. They accept the inequality of positions and roles when it comes to work 
which is often their main source of income. This may be explained by our immersion in 
modern technology and our admiration of the apparent freedom it offers. The more 
we immerse in the word of technology, the less we notice the consequences this 
brings.  
The question whether Uber and fleet partners operate within the law or in the 
shadow economy remains unanswered, mainly because there is no clear-cut regulatory 
framework in place. As neither Polish nor European legislation keeps up with 
technological changes, the entire sphere of app- and platform-based work tests the 
limits of the law. 
 
 
References 
 
Adriaanse M. (2016), “Profits and Precarity: Uber and the Crisis of Work”, Working Paper, 
Leiden University, 1–15. 
Arcidiacono D., A. Gandini, I. Pais (2018), “Sharing our way into the future”, The 
Sociological Review, 66(2):466-471. 
Armano E., A. Murgia (2017), “Hybrid Areas of Work in Italy: Hypotheses to Interpret the 
Transformations of Precariousness and Subjectivity”, in E. Armano, A. Bove, A. Murgia 
(eds.), Mapping Precariousness, Labour Insecurity and Uncertain Livelihoods: 
Subjectivities and Resistance, Routledge, pp. 47–59. 
Barbier J-C., A. Brygoo, and F. Viguier (2002), Defining and Assessing Precarious 
Employment in Europe: A Review of Main Studies and Surveys. A Tentative Approach to 
Precarious Employment in France, ESOPE Project. 
Belk R. (2007) “Why Not Share Rather Than Own?”, The ANNALS of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, 611:126-140. 
Dominika Polkowska, Does the app contribute to the precarization of work?A case of Uber drivers in Poland 
 
737 
 
Belk R. (2014) “Sharing Versus Pseudo-Sharing in Web 2.0”, The Anthropologist, 18(1):7-
23. 
Belk R. (2017) “Sharing without caring”, Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and 
Society, 10: 249–261. 
Berg J., M. Furrer, E. Harmon, U. Rani, M. Silberman (2018), Digital Labour Platforms and 
the Future of Work: Towards Decent Work in the Online World, Geneva: International 
Labour Organization. 
Berger T., C. Frey, G. Levin, S. Danda (2018), “Uber Happy? Work and Well-Being in the 
‘Gig Economy’”, Working paper to be presented at the 68th Panel Meeting of Economic 
Policy.  https://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/academic/201809_ 
Frey_Berger_UBER.pdf. 
Bosmans K., S. Hardonk, N. De Cuyper, F. Louckx (2016), “Expert Views on the 
Manifestations of Precarious Employment in Flanders”, Interface Demography Working 
Paper, Vrije Universiteit Brussel 3:1–21. 
Bröckling U. (2005), “Gendering the enterprising self”, Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal 
of Social Theory, 6(2): 7-25. 
Burrows S. (2013), “Precarious Work, Neo-Liberalism and Young People’s Experiences of 
Employment in the Illawarra Region”, The Economic and Labour Relations Review, 
24(3):380–96. 
Butler J. (2006), Precarious Life. The Powers of Mourning and Violence, London: Verso. 
Campbell I., R. Price (2016), “Precarious Work and Precarious Workers: Towards an 
Improved Conceptualisation”, The Economic and Labour Relations Review, 27(3):314–
32. 
Carpagnano M. (2018), "The ECJ’s Ruling on Uber: A New Room for Regulating Sharing 
Platforms?", Italian Antitrust Review, 5(1): 121-133 
CBOS. (2017), Działalność związków zawodowych w Polsce. Report no. 87. Warsaw: CBOS. 
Chen M., M. Sheldon (2016), “Dynamic Pricing in a Labor Market: Surge Pricing and 
Flexible Work on the Uber Platform”, Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on 
Economics and Computation, 1–19. 
Codagnone Ch., F. Biagi, F. Abadie (2016), The Passions and the Interests: Unpacking the 
'Sharing Economy', Institute for Prospective Technological Studies, JRC Science for 
Policy Report EUR 27914 E. 
Coyle D. (2017), “Precarious and Productive Work in the Digital Economy”, National 
Institute Economic Review, 240(1):5–14. 
Cramer J., A. Krueger (2016), “Disruptive Change in the Taxi Business: The Case of Uber”, 
American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings, 106(5):177–82. 
Partecipazione e conflitto, 12(3) 2019: 717-741, DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v12i3p717 
  
738 
 
Crespo Y. (2016), “Uber v. Regulation: ‘Ride-Sharing’ Creates a Legal Grey Area”, 
University of Miami Business Law Review, 25(1):79–110. 
Degryse Ch. (2017), “Shaping the World of Work in the Digital Economy”, Retrieved 
February 15, 2019 http://www.etui.org/content/download/25487/242907 
/file/Foresight+brief_01_EN_web.pdf. 
Dorre K. (2014), “Precarity and Social Disintegration: A Relational Concept”, Journal Für 
Entwicklungspolitik, 30: 69-89. 
Dörre K., K. Kraemer, F. Speidel (2006), “The Increasing Precariousness of the 
Employment Society: Driving Force for a New Right Wing Populism?”, International 
Journal of Action Research, 2(1):98–128. 
Drache D., A. LeMesurier, Y. Noiseux (2015), Non-Standard Employment, The Jobs Crisis 
and Precarity: A Report on the Structural Transformation of the World of Work. 
Montreal. 
Drahokoupil J., B. Fabo (2016), “The Platform Economy and the Disruption of the 
Employment Relationship”, ETUI Policy Brief European Economic, Employment and 
Social Policy, 5(1):2–5. 
Dubal V.B. (2017), “The Drive to Precarity: A Political History of Work, Regulation, & Labor 
Advocacy in San Francisco’s Taxi & Uber Economies”, Berkeley Journal of Employment 
& Labor Law, 38(1):75–135. 
European Commission. (2018). “The use of collaborative platforms”, Flash 
Eurobarometer, 467. 
Fabo, B., Beblavý, M., Kilhoffer, Z., Lenaerts, K. (2017), An Overview of European 
Platforms: Scope and Business Models, Joint Research Centre: Science for Policy 
Report, European Commission. 
Flores O., L. Rayle (2017), “How Cities Use Regulation for Innovation: The Case of Uber, 
Lyft and Sidecar in San Francisco”, Transportation Research Procedia, 25: 3760–72. 
Foucault M. (2008), The Birth of Biopolitics. Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979. 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Forde Ch., M. Stuart, S. Joyce, L. Oliver, D. Valizade, G. Alberti, K. Hardy, V. Trappmann, 
Ch. Umney, C. Carson (2017), The Social Protection of Workers in the Platform 
Economy. European Parliament. 
Gierten D. (2016), “New Forms of Work in the Digital Economy”, Report: Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD. 
Gillespie T. (2010), “The Politics of ‘Platforms’”, New Media and Society, 12 (3):347–64. 
Hall J., A. Krueger (2017), “An Analysis of the Labor Market for Uber’s Driver-Partners in 
the United States”, ILR Review, 71 (3):705–32. 
Dominika Polkowska, Does the app contribute to the precarization of work?A case of Uber drivers in Poland 
 
739 
 
Hardy J. (2015), “The Institutional, Structural and Agential Embeddedness of Precarity: An 
Engagement with Guy Standing”, Warsaw Forum of Economic Sociology, 1(11):7–24. 
Hewison K., A. Kalleberg (2013), “Precarious Work and Flexibilization in South and 
Southeast Asia”, American Behavioral Scientist, 57 (4):395–402. 
Hua J., K. Ray (2018), “Beyond the Precariat: Race, Gender, and Labor in the Taxi and Uber 
Economy”, Social Identities, 24 (2):271–89. 
Huang J., F. Majid, M. Daku (2019), “Estimating Effects of Uber Ride-Sharing Service on 
Road Traffic-Related Deaths in South Africa: A Quasi-Experimental Study”, Journal of 
Epidemiology and Community Health, 73(3):263-271. 
Huws U., N. Spencer, S. Joyce (2016), “Crowd Work in Europe.” Foundation for European 
Progressive Studies, 58. 
Jamil R., Y. Noiseux (2018), “Shake That Moneymaker: Insights from Montreal’s Uber 
Drivers”, Revue Interventions Économiques, 60: 0–30. 
Kalleberg A. (2009), “Precarious Work, Insecure Workers: Employment Relations in 
Transition”, American Sociological Review, 74 (1):1–22. 
Kalleberg A. (2014), “Measuring Precarious Work”, A Working Paper of the EINet 
Measurement Group. 
Kashyap R., A. Bhatia (2018), “Taxi Drivers and Taxidars: A Case Study of Uber and Ola in 
Delhi”, Journal of Developing Societies, 34 (2):1–26. 
Lobel O. (2016). “The Law of the Platform”, Minnesota Law Review, 16-212: 87–166. 
Lorey I. (2006). “Governmentality and Self-Precarization: On the Normalization of Cultural 
Producers”, Transversal 1, http://eipcp.net/transversal/1106/lorey/en. 
Lorey I. (2015), State of Insecurity: Governement of the Precarious, London: Verso 
Malin B., C. Chandler (2017), “Free to Work Anxiously: Splintering Precarity Among 
Drivers for Uber and Lyft”, Communication, Culture and Critique, 10 (2):382–400. 
Marino S., M. Bernaciak, A. Mrozowicki, V. Pulignano (2019), “Unions for Whom? Union 
Democracy and Precarious Workers in Poland and Italy”, Economic and Industrial 
Democracy, 40 (1): 111-131. 
Martins, P. (2019), “Sharing economy, competition and regulation: the case of Uber in the 
case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union”, UNIO - EU Law Journal, 5(1): 
54-67. 
McKee D. (2017), “The Platform Economy: Natural, Neutral, Consensual and Efficient?”, 
Transnational Legal Theory, 8 (4): 455–95. 
Mira d’Ercole, M. and M. MacDonald (2018), “Measuring platform and other new forms 
of work: Issues paper”, 15th meeting of the Committee on Statistics and Statistical 
Policy (CSSP), OECD internal document, 10, Paris. 
Partecipazione e conflitto, 12(3) 2019: 717-741, DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v12i3p717 
  
740 
 
Muntaner C. (2018), “Digital Platforms, Gig Economy, Precarious Employment, and the 
Invisible Hand of Social Class”, International Journal of Health Services, 48 (4):597–600. 
Murgia A., G. Selmi (2012), “‘Inspire and Conspire’: Italian Precarious Workers between 
Self-Organization and Self-Advocacy”, Interface: A Journal for and about Social 
Movements, 4 (2):181–96. 
Owczarek D. (2018), Don’t Gig Up! Extending Social Protection to Gig Workers in Poland: 
State of the Art Report. Warsaw: Instytut Spraw Publicznych 
Peticca-Harris A., N. DeGama, M. N. Ravishankar (2018), “Postcapitalist Precarious Work 
and Those in the ‘Drivers’ Seat: Exploring the Motivations and Lived Experiences of 
Uber Drivers in Canada”, Organization, 1–24. 
Petriglieri G., S. J. Ashford, A. Wrzesniewski (2018), “Agony and Ecstasy in the Gig 
Economy: Cultivating Holding Environments for Precarious and Personalized Work 
Identities”, Administrative Science Quarterly, 1–47. 
Prassl J., M. Risak (2015), “Uber, Taskrabbit, & Co: Platforms as Employers? Rethinking 
the Legal Analysis of Crowdwork”, Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal, 37 (3): 690. 
Pulignano V., L. Gervasi, F. de Franceschi (2016), “Union Responses to Precarious 
Workers: Italy and Spain Compared”, European Journal of Industrial Relations, 22(1): 
39–55. 
Rodgers G., J. Rodgers (1989), Precarious Jobs in Labour Market Regulation: The Growth 
of Atypical Employment in Western Europe. Geneva. 
Rosenblat A., L. Stark (2016), “Algorithmic Labor and Information Asymmetries: A Case 
Study of Uber’s Drivers”, International Journal of Communication, 10:3758–3784. 
Rosenblat A. (2018), Uberland: How Algorithms Are Rewriting the Rules of Work, Oakland, 
California: University of California Press. 
Savage M., F. Devine, N. Cunningham, M. Taylor, Y. Li, J. Hjellbrekke, B. Le Roux, S. 
Friedman, A. Miles (2013), “A New Model of Social Class? Findings from the BBC’s 
Great British Class Survey Experiment”, Sociology, 47(2):219–50. 
Shipler D. (2005), The Working Poor: Invisible in America. New York: Vintage 
Srnicek N. (2017), Platform Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity. 
Statistics Poland (2019), Labour market in 2017. Warsaw: GUS. 
Standing G. (2011), The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class. London, New York: 
Bloomsbury Academic. 
Stefano V. (2015), “The Rise of the ‘Just-in-Time Workforce’: On-Demand Work, Crowd 
Work and Labour Protection in the ‘Gig-Economy’”, SSRN Electronic Journal, 71. 
Sundararajan A. (2016), The Sharing Economy: The End of Employment and the Rise of 
Crowd-Based Capitalism. Cambridge and London: The MIT Press. 
Dominika Polkowska, Does the app contribute to the precarization of work?A case of Uber drivers in Poland 
 
741 
 
Strauss A., B. Glaser (2017), The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative 
Research, London and New York: Routledge. 
Surie A., J. Koduganti (2016), “The Emerging Nature of Work in Platform Economy 
Companies in Bengaluru, India: The Case of Uber and Ola Cab Drivers”, E-Journal of 
International and Comparative Labour Studies, 5 (3). 
Tucker E. (2017), “Uber and the Unmaking and Remaking of Taxi Capitalisms: Technology, 
Law and Resistance in Historical Perspective”, Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper, 
38: 1–23. 
Vosko L. (2006), “Precarious Employment: Towards an Improved Understanding of Labour 
Market Insecurity”, in L. Vosko (ed.), Precarious Employment: Understanding Labour 
Market Insecurity in Canada, Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press. 
Wright E. (2016), “Is the Precariat a Class?”, Global Labour Journal, 7(2):123–35. 
Zwick A. (2018), “Welcome to the Gig Economy: Neoliberal Industrial Relations and the 
Case of Uber”, GeoJournal, 83(4):679–91. 
 
 
Author’s Information: 
 
DOMINIKA POLKOWSKA is Assistant Professor of Sociology at the MARIA CURIE-
SKLODOWSKA UNIVERSITY (Poland) where She is also Deputy Director of The 
Institute of Sociology. 
 
 
